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Abstract 
In this paper, we estimate separate UK money demand functions for the household and 
corporate sectors.  Our approach allows for known differences across sectors; estimates 
equations with different functional forms; and estimates, rather than assumes, a scale 
elasticity. We use the estimation results to calculate estimates of the welfare cost of inflation, 
both by sector and in aggregate; and we consider the relative burden borne by the two sectors. 
We find that the welfare cost is much higher for the household sector than that for the 
corporate sector – which is in sharp contrast to previous (US) evidence that this welfare cost 
is borne equally across these two sectors. Also, we find that the aggregate welfare cost 
estimates are much smaller than previous (largely US) estimates – sufficiently smaller as to 
challenge the oft-quoted Lucas finding that shoe leather costs are by no means trivial. For the 
UK, we find welfare costs that are no greater than one tenth of a per cent of real income.  
 
Keywords 
Welfare cost of inflation; ‘Shoe-leather’ costs; Demand for money; Sectoral money demand;  
JEL Classification 
E31; E41 
Acknowledgments 
   
* Corresponding Author.  We are grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor for 
thoughtful comments which have helped us improve the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.  
 
 2 
 
Introduction 
There has been a marked revival of interest in measuring the welfare cost of inflation, largely 
stemming from Lucas (2000). Lucas provides a substantive summary of work on the welfare 
cost of inflation and provides measures using Bailey’s (1956) consumer surplus approach as 
well as the compensating variation approach. Importantly, his estimates served to counter any 
received wisdom that ‘shoe-leather costs’ of inflation are relatively trivial in macroeconomic 
terms. Few would argue that (nearly) 1% of US GNP in perpetuity is inconsequential – and 
this is the Lucas estimate of the welfare gain from reducing the annual inflation rate from 10 
per cent to zero (Lucas, 2000, p.247). Indeed, Chadha et al (1998) report Lucas referring to 
the net present value as -‘this is real money’ (p.364).  
 
Lucas (2000) ensured that the welfare cost of inflation has again assumed importance among 
the classic questions in monetary economics; and a recent flurry of papers adopting the 
Bailey-Lucas approach attests to the on-going research interest (see, for example, Attanasio et 
al, 2002, Calza and Zaghini, 2010, 2011; Ireland, 2009; and Serletis and Yavari, 2004, 2007). 
One reason for this on-going interest derives from the fact that estimates of the welfare cost 
of inflation provide a basis for estimating potential welfare gains from implementing 
monetary policies to reduce inflation. The prevalence of inflation in relatively recent 
economic history both in the US and in Europe has ensured that measures to maintain low 
and stable inflation have become central in contemporary monetary economics; just as 
measuring the impact of policies to reduce inflation have become central in contemporary 
macroeconomics. For example, with policies of low but positive inflation now well 
established in many economies, questions arise about the cost of these policies when 
compared with Friedman’s optimal policy rule; and welfare cost estimates can usefully shed 
light on this (as done in Ireland, 2009 and Calza and Zaghini, 2011). Furthermore, the 
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generalised shift from double digit inflation towards lower inflation both in the US and in 
Europe has given added impetus to the relevance of calculating welfare cost estimates. For 
example, Calza and Zaghini (2010) calculate welfare costs of inflation in order to provide 
estimates of the welfare gains obtained from the recent ‘Great Disinflation’ in the US. More 
generally, the more recent literature has provided estimates of welfare gains from reducing 
inflation which inform contemporary thinking on the issue. 
 
Fundamental to all of this work on estimating welfare cost is the underlying demand for 
money behaviour; and the validity of obtaining estimates of the welfare cost of inflation by 
integrating under the money demand function.1  Amongst issues raised in the recent literature 
are: i) the chosen functional form for the demand for money – whether the double logarithmic 
functional form better captures the money demand behaviour than the semi-logarithmic 
functional form; and ii) the potential importance of fully estimating the interest elasticity of 
the demand for money. These issues do matter. For example, Ireland (2009) shows how the 
welfare costs implied by the two functional forms may differ substantially;2 and Serletis and 
Yavari (2004) find significantly smaller estimates of the welfare cost when they estimate the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money.3  
 
These findings underscore the importance of determining the appropriate form of the money 
demand function for estimating this welfare cost of inflation.  In this paper we estimate 
                                                          
1
 The most quoted (and thus influential) paper is Lucas (2000); and Gillman (1995) provides clear evidence for 
the validity of integrating under the money demand function. 
 
2 For example, an on-going two per cent inflation is calculated to cost the economy 1.09 percent of income with 
the double-log functional form and just 0.25 percent with the semi-log (Ireland, 2009, p.1041); with such 
divergence particularly marked at low values of the interest rate. For these calculations, Ireland takes Lucas 
(2000) and the assumptions therein as given. 
 
3
 For example, using the double-log money demand specification but relaxing the imposed 0.5 interest elasticity, 
Serletis and Yavari (2004) report estimates of the welfare cost five times smaller than those of Lucas (p.202).  
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money demand behaviour in the UK taking account of two further issues. Firstly, we estimate 
the scale elasticity of money demand. Imposing a unit scale elasticity is typical in this 
literature – and fairly uncontentious for the US, the context for many of these studies – yet a 
relatively recent survey of cross country demand for money studies (Sriram, 2001) reports 
values for the scale elasticity in the range of 0.4 to over 3 for narrowly defined monetary 
aggregates (Table 2, pp.351-8); and a unit scale elasticity has little support in the UK context. 
Secondly, rather than estimating an aggregate demand for money, we separately estimate 
demand for money functions for each of the household and (private non-financial) corporate 
sectors. In this way, we allow for the well-known fact that money demand behaviour differs 
across these sectors (see for example: Goldfeld, 1973; Drake and Chrystal, 1994, 1997; Jain 
and Moon, 1994; Butkiewicz and McConnell, 1995; and von Landesberger, 2007).4 The 
evidence that parameter/coefficient estimates differ across sectors, of itself, gives support to 
our strategy of sectoral disaggregation; but also, estimating sectoral demand for money 
equations will allow us to calculate welfare cost estimates for each sector. Whilst the welfare 
cost of inflation, in aggregate, is unavoidable, it may be that one sector may be more adept at 
shifting the burden elsewhere. This could be important, not least because differential burdens 
suggest that the two sectors would assign rather different weight to policies designed to 
reduce inflation; and, more generally, would assign rather different weight to a stated 
                                                          
4
 Differences in sectoral money demand behaviour could reflect different constraints on money holding 
decisions (different regulatory factors and/or access to wholesale markets) which may account for empirical 
findings that the corporate sector is more responsive to both the opportunity cost and the scale variables (see for 
example Jain and Moon, 1994 (US); Drake and Chrystal, 1994,1997 (UK)).  Jain and Moon (1994) report 
significant interest elasticities (-1.1) for US Business M1 holdings yet negligible elasticities for Households; and 
higher scale elasticities for the Business M1 holdings. Drake and Chrystal (1994) report strong interest 
elasticities for UK company sector holdings of narrow and broad monetary aggregates (-4.3, -2.6 and -2.6); 
whilst Drake and Chrystal (1997) find much smaller interest elasticities for UK personal sector holdings of  two 
broad monetary aggregates (-0.1, -0.2). With regard to scale elasticities, Drake and Chrystal (1997) explicitly 
make a sectoral comparison, noting much higher estimated coefficients in the company sector (all in the range 
of 2.5 to 3) and arguing that this provides further evidence for estimating separate sectoral money demand 
equations.  
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commitment to inflation targets (now so prevalent across so many countries).  Our approach 
allows us to address this question. 
 
We therefore use the results from our estimation work not only to provide estimates of the 
welfare cost of inflation (by sector) but also to consider the relative burden borne by each of 
the sectors. In this regard, this paper parallels analysis undertaken by Calza and Zaghini 
(2010) - the only previous paper to address the sectoral burden - but with data from the UK 
rather than the US. Whilst Calza and Zaghini found evidence of equal sharing of the burden, 
we find that the household sector bears a disproportionately high burden of the welfare cost 
of inflation. Perhaps more importantly, we find estimates of the welfare costs that are 
nowhere near as large as those found by Lucas. In this study, the cost of a 10% inflation is 
never found to be higher than 0.1% of GDP – some ten times smaller than the oft-quoted 
estimate of 1% GDP. The scale of difference is such that we are forced to some modification 
of the view that these costs are non-trivial, at least for the UK.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly sets out the Lucas-Bailey approach to the 
measurement of the welfare cost of inflation and makes explicit its relationship to underlying 
money demand behaviour. Section 2 deals with some relevant data and estimation issues 
before proceeding to present results from estimating different money demand functions for 
both households and corporations. Section 3 calculates welfare costs of inflation under a 
number of scenarios. Section 4 draws some conclusions. 
 
1.    Welfare cost and money demand 
The specification of the underlying money demand function is fundamental to the estimation 
of the welfare cost of inflation. Whilst early contributors (such as Bailey, 1956 and Friedman, 
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1969) had used a semi-log demand schedule, Lucas (2000) argues that the double log 
(constant elasticity) is more appropriate for his US data set consisting of annual data 
extending from 1900 to 1994. Ireland (2009) notes that this almost century-long data period 
spans two unusual episodes in US monetary history (in the late 1940s and the late 1970s) and 
suggests that these may be unduly influential in driving a preference for the log-log money 
demand specification. We follow Ireland (2009) and estimate both functional forms to see 
which is the best fit for our data.  
The two money demand equations can be written: ݈݋݃ ሺܯȀܲሻ ൌ ݈݋݃ ܣ ൅ ߚ݈݋݃ሺܵܿሻ െ ߟ݈݋݃ሺݎሻ                              (1) ݈݋݃ ሺܯȀܲሻ ൌ ݈݋݃ܤ ൅ ߚ ݈݋݃ሺܵܿሻ െ ߛሺݎሻ                          (2) 
where: (M/P) is real balances; (Sc) is the relevant scale variable, differing for personal and 
corporate sectors (measured in real terms); and r is the opportunity cost variable (the nominal 
interest rate). 
To estimate the welfare cost associated with a nominal interest rate, we adopt the traditional 
approach developed by Bailey (1956). This approach involves calculating the inverse of the 
money demand function and integrating on the interval of defined nominal interest rates.5  
The expressions obtained define the welfare costs associated with a specific positive level of 
the nominal interest rate, ݎ and, crudely, measure the ‘welfare triangles’: 
  Welfare cost = ܹܥሺݎሻ ൌ ܣሺܵܿሻሺఉሻ ቀ ఎଵିఎቁ ݎሺଵିఎሻ        (3) 
Welfare cost = ܹܥሺݎሻ ൌ ஻ఊ ሺܵܿሻሺఉሻሾͳ െ ሺͳ ൅ ߛݎሻ݁ିఊ௥ሿ                   (4) 
From these expressions, it is clear that estimates of the welfare cost of inflation require three 
parameter values from each of equations (1) and (2): the value of the intercept; the scale 
                                                          
5
 Since the nominal interest rate, r is the sum of the real rate of interest, rreal  and inflation, the welfare cost of 
inflation is given by integrating on the interval (rreal, r). See Chadha et al (1998). 
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elasticity; and the interest elasticity (for the log-log specification) or semi-elasticity (for the 
semi-log).  
 
Since these parameter values derive from money demand behaviour which is likely to differ 
between households and firms (Goldfeld, 1973, Jain and Moon, 1994, Drake and Chrystal, 
1994, 1997), we separately estimate equations (1) and (2) for each of the household and (non-
financial) corporate sectors. By allowing for differences in terms of motives for holding 
money balances, access to payments technologies and money management practices across 
sectors, we expect to obtain more precise estimates of the key parameter values relevant for 
calculating the welfare cost of inflation. This is over and above the greater precision gained 
from fully estimating (rather than assuming) values for these key behavioural response 
parameters. 
 
2.     Estimating money demand 
The sample period for our estimation work, from the second quarter of 1978 (the earliest date 
for which relevant data is available, after allowing for lags) to the second quarter of 2008, 
covers a sufficiently long period of both high and low inflation to permit us to draw 
conclusions about money demand behaviour across inflation regimes. The period spans some 
three decades; and captures two periods of disinflation from double digit inflation. Inflation 
was 21% in 1980(Q2) dropping to 2.6% by 1986(Q3); was up to 10% in 1990(Q3) falling to 
1.3% in 1993(Q2).  
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We use data on sectoral holdings of (M1) monetary assets held by households and (non-
financial) corporations, made available by the Bank of England.6 These relate to holdings of 
sterling notes and coins and sterling sight deposits with UK monetary financial institutions. 
Aggregation of these monetary assets closely corresponds to the definition of the monetary 
aggregates used by Calza and Zaghini (2010) (and Lucas, 2000 and Ireland, 2009). To reflect 
the different motives for holding monetary assets across the sectors, the scale variable used 
for households’ demand is total consumer spending; and, for the (non-financial) corporate 
sector, we use GDP, following Drake and Chrystal (1994).7 Data for money and the scale 
variables are all seasonally adjusted; and are deflated by the consumer price index (for the 
household sector) and the producer price index (for the corporate sector). We use the three 
month Treasury bill rate, as a proxy for the risk free return, to measure the opportunity cost.8  
 
An important issue relevant both to the selection of the monetary assets for the dependent 
variable and to the measure of the opportunity cost variable is that, over the sample period, an 
increasing share of bank sight deposit accounts started to pay interest. If we were to exclude 
                                                          
6
 The authors are grateful to the Bank of England for the provision of data on sectoral holdings of monetary 
assets: Quarterly amounts outstanding of households' sterling holdings of notes and coin, monetary financial 
institutions' sterling non-interest-bearing sight deposits, and UK resident banks'  sterling interest bearing sight 
deposits (in sterling millions); and Quarterly amounts outstanding of private non-financial corporations' sterling 
holdings of notes and coin, monetary financial institutions' sterling non-interest-bearing sight deposits, UK 
resident banks' sterling interest-bearing sight deposits (in sterling millions) – all seasonally adjusted. Building 
Society deposits are excluded from our monetary aggregate. The class of building society deposits most similar 
to bank sight deposits is instant access deposits, but this may include deposits which require notice of up to 
seven days to withdraw funds without penalty. In contrast, sight deposits may be withdrawn immediately, 
without penalty. 
 
7 We would have preferred to use a sector-specific scale variable such as ‘real business GDP’ used by, for 
example, Jain and Moon (1994) and Calza and Zaghini (2010) – both US studies. However, presumably like 
Drake  and Chrystal, we found data availability is limited when working with UK data.  
 
8
 There is an element of arbitrariness about the selection of the monetary aggregate (acknowledged by Lucas, 
2000). Following Ireland (2009) and Lucas (2000), we use M1 as the relevant reference definition of money – 
the sum of currency holdings (that do not pay interest) and demand deposits (that may or may not pay interest). 
We treat M1 as the best available proxy for the monetary aggregate providing monetary services that deliver 
consumer surplus to its holders. Interest rate data was obtained from the Bank of England database; all other 
data series from the Office of National Statistics (ONS). 
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this interest-bearing money, we would bias the welfare cost of inflation (essentially because 
technological innovations have ensured that these assets provide equivalent monetary 
services – see Cysne and Turchick, 2010). However, their inclusion makes the specification 
of the opportunity cost somewhat tricky. There is an argument that a more appropriate 
opportunity cost variable would be the difference between the Treasury bill rate and that paid 
on interest-bearing sight deposits – although this is not relevant for the non-interest-bearing 
components of the aggregate. Since data on the rates paid on commercial bank deposits is not 
available until the mid-1990s, we use the Treasury Bill rate as a ‘best proxy’. 
 
As a preliminary to estimating the demand functions, we examine the statistical properties of 
the variables. Unit root tests (see Appendix Table A1) confirm that sector holdings of real M1 
balances, real consumption and real GDP are stationary in first differences. The nominal 
interest rate may be either trend stationary or first difference stationary and thus it is 
reasonable to test for cointegration and, in the event of finding cointegration, proceed to 
estimation. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 summarises the estimation results. At the foot of the table are the results from testing 
for cointegration of the variables in each equation: Johansen’s maximum likelihood estimator 
rejects no cointegration, but cannot reject a maximum of one cointegrating vector. We 
therefore infer that the three variables - real money balances, the relevant scale variable and 
the opportunity cost variable - meet the minimum requirement of constituting a cointegrating 
vector in each sector. Table 1 also presents estimates using the Auto-Regressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) estimator of Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al (2001); the full 
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estimating equation for the ARDL method being equation (5) below.
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Where:  m is log (M/P); Δ is the first difference operator, s is log (SC); R is the nominal 
interest rate (or its log); ande is the error term. The results of the parsimonious estimation of 
the ARDL obtained using the general to specific method, are given in the upper part of the 
table, together with inferred (long-run) estimates of the key parameters in equations (1) and 
(2) calculated from the parsimonious equation. The estimation of these functions for the UK
 
is notoriously difficult but it can be seen that each of the four estimated equations satisfy the 
usual battery of tests. Cointegration also indicates stable long run parameters. Furthermore, 
not only does the 12 quarters ahead Chow forecast test indicate parameter stability but also, 
the CUSUM statistic remains within the error bounds (see Appendix 2). We conclude that we 
have evidence of stable and robust long-run money demand relationships which can be used 
for inference about the underlying welfare costs implied for each sector.  
 
Turning to the estimated coefficients, it is evident that the underlying money demand 
behaviour is markedly different across the two sectors, underscoring the importance of 
having specified separate equations for estimation (we also note that the underlying lag is 
shorter for the corporate sector, possibly implying better information and greater ability to 
react).  For each sector, the estimated coefficients on the opportunity cost variable are similar 
to those found by Calza and Zaghini (2010). However, the estimated elasticities of the scale 
variable are worthy of further comment. It was noted in the introduction that a unit scale 
elasticity has little support in the UK context9 and this is a reason for our estimating the 
                                                          
9 There is very little recent work on the demand for money in the UK.  Bissoondeeal et al (2010) find long-run 
money demand relationships for the UK household sector for both a Divisia and a simple sum (broad) measure 
of money. They report four estimates of the coefficient on the scale variable that are each significantly different 
from unity – the highest of which is 1.36. Drake and Chrystal (1994) report a (normalised) estimate of the 
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elasticity here (and testing the validity of imposing a unit scale elasticity).  The estimated 
coefficients are in the range of 2.2 to 3.4; and each of the four estimates is found to be 
significantly different from unity. This demonstrates that the assumption of unit elasticity – 
often made in previous work for the US - would not be appropriate here.   
 
The relatively high scale elasticities reported here warrant some additional comment. For the 
corporate sector, such high values are not surprising. For example, Drake and Chrystal (1997) 
report coefficient estimates on the scale variable in the range of 2.5 to 3, pointing to “ … 
[t]heoretical work by, for example, Miller and Orr (1966) [suggesting] … that these values 
are plausible for the corporate sector …” (p.204). However, for the household sector, scale 
elasticities above unity are less readily explained. Whilst it is not difficult to find estimated 
scale elasticities of (aggregate) money demand which exceed unity (see, for example, Sriram, 
2001), presenting an intuitive explanation for such findings is more challenging. Having said 
that, this has long been recognised in the literature – both Cuthbertson (1985) and Laidler 
(1993) discuss factors driving the relationship between money holdings and income (desired 
transactions volume) in opposite directions. Both point to the possibility that households 
economise on time when the opportunity cost of time in terms of forgone income rises. As a 
result, “the volume of money holding associated with any planned volume of transactions 
[would] rise … [and] might well swamp the economies of scale associated with a growing 
transactions volume” (Laidler, 1993, p.181). For the sample period used in this paper, 
velocity falls for both household and corporate sector M1 holdings – entirely consistent with 
estimated scale elasticities above unity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
coefficient on the scale elasticity of 3.22 for NIBM1. Cuthbertson and Taylor (1987) report an estimate for the 
scale elasticity for M1 of 2.08.  
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Having established that we have found stable and robust long run money demand 
relationships, we turn to the main thrust of this work which is to use the (robust) estimated 
coefficients to calculate the welfare cost. This is the focus of the work undertaken in the next 
section. Since the estimation results presented in Table 1 provided no clear preference for one 
functional form, we follow Calza and Zaghini (2010) and use estimates from both functional 
forms, not least as a test of robustness and consistency.
 
 
3.    Calculating the welfare cost 
Having estimated the demand for money functions, it is relatively straightforward to obtain 
measures of the welfare cost associated with a specific level of the interest rate. We take the 
Table 1 estimates of the long-run coefficients ߚǡߟߛin equations (1) and (2) and insert 
these into the expressions for the welfare cost set out as equations (3) and (4). Following 
Lucas (2000), we calibrate values for the constants A and B so that they equal the average 
value over the sample of (M/P)(Sc)-ߚߟሺȀሻ(Sc)-ߚߛǤ 
 
The resultant values measure the consumer surplus lost when agents reduce their money 
holdings in the light of inflation. This is obviously a monetary measure. More commonly 
reported in the literature is this measure calculated as a fraction of the scale variable. For ease 
of comparison, in the Tables below, we report both measures. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 2 takes a typical inflation example from the literature – a 10 per cent inflation (with an 
assumed real rate of interest of 3%). What is not typical is the breakdown by sector. This is 
important. Previous research indicates that there are significant differences in the demand for 
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money between these sectors in the UK (Belongia and Chrystal, 1991 and Drake and 
Chrystal, 1994, 1997). In our work, we too have found marked differences across the sectors. 
Taking account of these differences should result not only in more accurate measures of the 
welfare cost, but also, allows us to address the question of whether inflation imposes greater 
costs on one sector relative to the other and thus, whether disinflation favours one sector over 
another. 
 
Welfare cost by sector (relative to price stability) 
Table 2 presents the welfare cost of a ten per cent inflation (WC(0.13)) together with the 
welfare cost of a ten per cent inflation relative to price stability (ΔW). The Table shows that, 
for the household sector, the estimated welfare cost of a 10% inflation is either £1,053million 
or £651million, depending on the underlying functional form for estimating money demand; 
and is, at most, around 0.1% of GDP. The welfare cost for the corporate sector is smaller, 
either £59million or £37million (and less than 0.01% of GDP). In general, there is evidence 
of the functional form influencing the size of the welfare cost; yet rather more importantly, 
these estimates indicate that the household sector bears by far the bigger burden of the 
aggregate welfare cost of the inflation – the (arguably more sophisticated) corporate sector 
bears little more than 5% of the burden (whichever functional form is employed). This result 
stands in contrast to that found by Calza and Zaghini (2010) – the only other paper to present 
such a sectoral breakdown: they found that the burden was equally shared across the sectors 
(in the US). The result suggests that, in the UK, households and firms may have different 
assessments of the welfare losses associated with inflation and may therefore value inflation 
targets rather differently; and may place different values on policies to reduce inflation (so 
popular in recent economic history).  
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We turn now to the actual scale of the welfare cost to households. This can be viewed from 
different perspectives. The traditional approach defines this welfare loss as the fraction of 
consumption households would require as compensation in order to make them indifferent 
between living in a steady state with 10% inflation and an otherwise identical state with price 
stability. On this basis, the welfare cost to households is either 0.12% or 0.10% of 
consumption (see Table 2). Whether one regards this as big or small will of course depend on 
the parameters one feeds into a Net Present Value formula, not least the time horizon. Yet 
whilst one would never deny the power of compounding, most might regard this as lying at 
the ‘small to trivial’ end of the spectrum. This is perhaps most readily inferred from the 
calculations of the burden on a per household basis. In the bottom portion of Table 2, we see 
that the burden borne is no more than about £28 (approx. $46) per household – albeit on a 
permanent per annum basis.10 
 
Aggregate welfare cost 
Given the relatively modest size of the welfare cost borne by households and the even smaller 
cost borne by corporations, it is no surprise to be reporting aggregate welfare costs which are 
small. In Table 2, the estimated welfare cost of 10% inflation (relative to price stability) is 
either £782million (0.08% GDP) or £645million (0.06% GDP), depending on the underlying 
functional form. Again there is evidence of functional form influencing the size of the 
welfare cost; yet, much more importantly, under each functional form, the calculated welfare 
cost is much lower than the oft-quoted benchmark of ‘slightly less than one percent [of real 
income]’. At this stage, two things should be noted: i) the ‘Lucas 1%’ relates to the welfare 
gain of reducing inflation from 10 percent to zero (comparable with figures presented in 
Table 3 of this paper); and ii) it is unexceptional to obtain estimates lower than that of Lucas: 
                                                          
10
  Attanasio et al (2002) also report very small values for the ‘welfare triangle’- 16 euros per household found 
in a study of microeconomic data relating to currency holdings of Italian households. 
 
 15 
 
a ranking of the estimates to be found in the literature places the ‘Lucas 1%’ firmly at the top. 
Having said that, the estimates reported here are pretty much at the bottom of the range.  We 
return to this point later, after testing for the robustness of our findings for 10% inflation 
reductions across different initial inflation rates.  
 
Known nonlinearities in the underlying money demand behaviour imply that the welfare cost 
implications of 10% inflation reductions will differ with different initial inflation rates, or 
equivalently, with different general inflation environments. In Table 3 we present the 
estimated welfare gain, ΔW, from reducing inflation by 10 percentage points from nominal 
interest rates of 13, 15 and 20%.  The most striking observation is that, whilst the calculated 
welfare gain from a disinflation of 10% is smaller in the higher general inflation environment 
when the demand for money has been estimated with a log-log specification, it is larger when 
the semi-log functional form has been specified. This simply reflects the shape of these 
schedules but, more importantly, it reinforces the importance of taking care both with the 
selection of the functional form for estimating the demand for money and then with the 
selection of interest rates used to calculate welfare costs.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
With regard to the robustness of our earlier findings, there is nothing in Table 3 which would 
lead us to conclude anything other than that which we had already concluded: functional form 
matters (but not sufficient to change any inference about the sectoral breakdown); the 
estimated welfare gain is small; and the welfare cost falls disproportionately on the household 
sector (the corporate sector bearing between 5 and 6% of the overall welfare cost). 
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Comparing welfare measures 
The small size of the estimated welfare costs (and gains) found here warrants further 
comment.  Given that different countries have been researched using a variety of data 
frequencies and estimating techniques, it is not surprising, that previous studies have 
produced a relatively broad range of estimates although the reported estimates in the 
literature are not strictly comparable with each other. Lucas (2000), Serletis and Yavari 
(2004) and Ireland (2009) are, very broadly, comparable in that they use M1 data for the US 
for overlapping data periods (1900-94; 1948-2001 and 1980-2006 respectively); although 
Ireland uses quarterly, not annual, data - and the much longer time horizon used in Lucas 
(2000) makes that study somewhat distinctive.11 Ireland (2009) estimates the welfare cost of a 
10% inflation at around 0.2%GDP; Serletis and Yavari (2004) estimate the welfare gain of 
reducing inflation from 14% to 3% at around 0.45%GDP attributing the difference between 
their result and that of Lucas to the lower interest elasticity (-0.22 as compared with -0.5 used 
in Lucas). When US M1 data is adjusted to exclude US dollars held abroad, Calza and 
Zaghini (2011) report an estimated welfare cost of a 10% inflation four times smaller than 
that of Ireland (2009) at around 0.05%GDP (having used data, adjusted for US dollar 
holdings overseas, for the same data period as that used by Ireland, 1980-2006).  
 
Estimates based on data from other countries are also lower than that found in the influential 
Lucas (2000) study. For example, Serletis and Yavari (2007) study seven Eurozone countries 
over the period 1960 to 2000 and report estimated gains from reducing inflation by 5% points 
in the range of 0.1%GDP in France to 0.5%GDP in Ireland.  Yet lower estimates have been 
found by, for example, Attanasio et al (2002) - using microeconomic data on currency 
                                                          
11 The only other study to use such a long span of (annual) data is Chadha et al (1998), reporting welfare cost 
estimates broadly in line with the Lucas 1% of GDP - but for the UK: 1870-1994. It does seem that estimation 
over long time spans yields the high estimates of welfare cost. 
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holdings by Italian households, they find that the welfare cost of inflation is never more than 
0.1% of consumption (and thus an even lower percentage of GDP).   
 
As is standard in this literature, all welfare calculations have been calculated at the sample 
average. In order to test the sensitivity of these results to this assumption and, therefore, to 
see the effect of the estimated coefficient values, we examined the sensitivity of our results to 
changes in the values of the scale, opportunity cost and monetary aggregate variables. 
Examining one standard deviation perturbations gave a maximum range for ΔW of 0.02% to 
0.17% of GDP (for the log-log) and 0.02% to 0.13% of GDP (for the semi-log). Even at these 
extremes, these welfare measures remain small. 
 
The welfare cost measure is smaller when the semi-logarithmic functional form is used; and it 
is smaller for lower estimated coefficients on the opportunity cost variable. Both of these 
features are already noted in the literature. For example, Ireland (2009) documents the 
former; and Serletis and Yavari (2004) and Ireland (2009) both attribute their welfare cost 
estimates lying below the benchmark ‘1% of GDP’ to lower estimated coefficients on the 
opportunity cost variable. The measures are also dependent on the estimated scale elasticity 
and this does create some difference when comparing our results with those found in work 
which has assumed a unit scale elasticity (known to be inappropriate for our UK context).  
 
Relative to Calza and Zaghini (2010), our estimated coefficients on the opportunity cost 
variable are either at the low end (or are lower than) the range of estimates they report; and 
our estimated coefficients on the scale variable are much higher.  As already noted in the 
more general context, our lower opportunity cost coefficients go some way towards 
explaining lower estimates of the welfare costs; but also relevant are differences captured in 
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the intercept term of the demand for money. It seems that the UK context for this study is 
particularly important – money demand behaviour in the UK (at least in the three decades 
since 1978) shows both households and firms as particularly effective in shielding themselves 
from the inflation tax. This result is not entirely surprising.  Boel and Camera (2011) is one of 
few papers to undertake a cross-country study of the welfare cost of inflation and they find 
that their estimates vary quite substantially across 23 OECD countries. Whilst their (model 
calibration) approach is not directly comparable with that employed here, the paper has 
relevance since the UK is included in their study. They report welfare cost measures for the 
UK which are consistently at the low end of the reported estimates. For example, in their 
benchmark calibration Table 2, the estimated welfare cost of a 10% inflation versus price 
stability for the UK is 0.02% of consumption (therefore an even lower percentage of GDP) 
compared with an average welfare cost across countries of 0.32% of consumption in the 
common sample. Furthermore, estimates for the UK are always smaller than those for the US 
with comparisons across 20 estimates which show the UK estimate to be smaller by a 
considerable factor – at least a factor of 1.75. 
 
Different behaviour in the UK relative to the US may lie in the different inflationary 
environments: in the US, there is strong awareness of the Great Disinflation – inflation at its 
highest (15%) in 1980 and brought under control by the end of the 1990s; in the UK, there 
have been two periods of disinflation from double digit inflation; inflation being significantly 
reduced from a height of over 20% (in 1980); and then rising again to double digits (10% in 
1990) before being controlled again. This ‘double-peak’ may have encouraged agents to 
manage their money holdings differently; and it is inefficiency in this money management 
that is measured in the Bailey estimates of welfare cost.  
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4.    Conclusion 
Since 2000, research on the welfare cost of inflation has undergone a significant revival, 
largely prompted by the publication of Lucas (2000). This paper is something of a tour de 
force providing a summary of research on the welfare cost of inflation – including theoretical 
justifications of the Bailey consumer surplus formulae; and presenting estimates of the 
welfare cost of inflation which suggest that ‘shoe leather costs’ of inflation may have 
important macroeconomic implications. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this stimulated a 
considerable amount of further research on the welfare cost of inflation (for example, 
Attanasio et al, 2002; Serletis and Yavari, 2004, 2007; Ireland, 2009; Calza and Zaghini, 
2010, 2011; Cysne and Turchick, 2010). This further research has generated a number of 
welfare cost estimates, though none are as high as that reported in Lucas (2000). This is 
potentially important, not least because these results constitute something of a challenge to 
the oft-quoted finding that - ‘shoe leather costs’ are by no means trivial (a 10% inflation 
imposing a welfare cost of nearly 1% of real income in perpetuity). 
 
This paper contributes to this literature by providing further estimates of the welfare cost of 
inflation having taken careful account of issues raised in that subsequent literature.  Using 
UK quarterly data for a 30 year period to 2008(2), we find stable and robust long-run money 
demand relationships for both household sector and corporate sector holdings of M1. The 
robust estimated coefficients are markedly different across the two sectors thereby justifying 
having specified separate equations for estimation; and, since these are used to calculate the 
welfare cost of inflation, contribute to different estimates of the welfare cost across the two 
sectors (and more accurate welfare measures). We find that the welfare cost for the household 
sector is much higher than that for the corporate sector. Indeed, the (arguably more 
sophisticated) corporate sector is found to bear little more than 5% of the overall welfare cost 
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in the UK – very different from the equal sharing of the burden found by the only other paper 
to provide a sectoral breakdown (Calza and Zaghini, 2010 - for the US). The finding of 
differential burdens could have important policy implications since the sectors may value 
policies to reduce inflation rather differently.  
 
At the aggregate level, this paper finds estimates of the welfare cost of inflation that are 
smaller than those reported in the recent literature. It seems that, at least in the UK, the 
specific inflation-related welfare costs are relatively trivial in macroeconomic terms (perhaps 
no greater than one tenth of a per cent of real income for a 10% inflation). Furthermore, the 
welfare gain from reducing inflation by 10 percentage points differs for different initial 
inflation rates, but again is found to be never higher than 0.1%GDP.  Further research is 
needed to ascertain whether this result carries over to other country contexts. 
 
It is of course inappropriate to suggest that the findings presented here imply that inflation is 
harmless. There are many good reasons for adopting a macroeconomic anti-inflation policy 
stance. The generalised move toward lower inflation in both Europe and the US delivers 
welfare benefits, but those which accrue from the reduction of ‘shoe-leather costs’ constitute 
a very small part in these. The debates will continue about appropriate inflation targets, price 
stability and the Friedman (1969) rule; but the implication is that the modelling frameworks 
used for analysis are likely to focus even more on the inefficient allocation of resources due 
to increased uncertainty, distortions to relative prices and arbitrary redistribution effects of 
wealth.  
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TABLE 1. DYNAMIC ESTIMATION RESULTS AND TESTS OF COINTEGRATION 
 
 HOUSEHOLD SECTOR CORPORATE SECTOR 
Functional Form Log-Log Semi-Log Log-Log Semi-Log 
Dependent Variable Δm Δm Δm Δm 
mt-1 -0.09***  
(0.03) 
-0.09***  
(0.03) 
-0.12***  
(0.04) 
-0.12***  
(0.04) 
     
Scale  st-1     
ct-1 
      (consumer spending) 
0.20***  
(0.06) 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
  
yt-1 
     (GDP) 
  0.41***  
(0.13) 
0.41***  
(0.13) 
Long-Run 2.22*** 2.20*** 3.42*** 3.42*** 
unit elasticity 9.89*** 9.87*** 9.58*** 9.87*** 
Opportunity Cost      
log rt-1 -0.015** 
 (0.006) 
 -0.024* 
 (0.013) 
 
rt-1  -0.19*** 
 (0.07) 
 -0.33** 
 (0.15) 
Long-Run 0.17*** 2.11*** 0.20* 2.75*** 
Intercept -1.32***  
(0.41) 
-1.25***  
(0.41) 
-3.27***  
(1.26) 
-3.67*** 
(1.25)  
Δ4mt-1 0.09*** 
 (0.02) 
0.08*** 
 (0.02) 
  
Δmt-3   0.27*** 
 (0.06) 
0.27*** 
 (0.06) 
Δyt-3   -1.09** 
(0.44) 
-1.16*** 
 (0.43) 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71 0.59 0.60 
SER 0.018 0.017 0.035 0.035 
LM5 0.99 0.97 0.83 0.75 
ARCH 0.01 0.01 3.16* 3.00* 
RESET 0.55 0.66 1.50 0.22 
CHOW 0.47 0.49 0.69 0.71 
Johansen Cointegration Tests 
0      
Max Eigen 31.98** 33.91** 33.91** 34.10** 
Trace 19.56* 20.91* 22.56** 23.34** 
1     
Max Eigen  11.36 15.49 11.35 10.76 
Trace 12.41 13.00 11.35 10.59 
 
 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   For the scale 
variables, c is log of total consumer spending measured in constant prices; and y is the log of GDP at 2005 prices. The long run scale and 
opportunity cost (semi) elasticity are calculated as α2/α1 and α3/α1, respectively. Δ4 is the fourth difference. Results presented are the 
parsimonious equations from the ARDL with the lags on the differenced terms being those indicated in the Table and determined as the lag 
required for residuals that satisfy the diagnostic tests. Full results of the unrestricted equation are available on request. In each equation, 
seasonal dummy variables are estimated and dummy variables are introduced to accommodate for significant outliers. LM5 is the F test 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for residual serial correlation of up to the 5th order; RESET is the F test Ramsey test for 
misspecification and ARCH is the F test of the test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. Unit elasticity is an F test of the 
validity of imposing a unit scale elasticity. CHOW is the F version of the forecast test: results reported refer to break at 2006Q1 (inference is 
robust across other break points). 
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TABLE 2.  WELFARE COST OF A 10% INFLATION, RELATIVE TO PRICE STABILITY 
 
 HOUSEHOLD SECTOR CORPORATE SECTOR AGGREGATE 
 Log-log Semi-log Log-log Semi-log Log-log Semi-log 
WC(0.13) 1052.8498 651.3628 59.2472 36.7226 1112.0970 688.0854 
WC(0.13) as 
%GDP 
0.1020 0.0631 0.0057 0.0036 0.1077 0.0667 
ΔW = WC(0.13) 
- WC(0.03) 
741.1016 611.5155 40.9152 34.3815 782.0168 645.8970 
ΔW as%C 0.1204 0.0994     
ΔW as%GDP 0.0718 0.0592 0.0040 0.0034 0.0758 0.0626 
ΔW per 
household
 
£28.21 £23.28     
Burden of 
welfare cost 
borne by 
corporate 
sector 
     
 
5.23% 
 
 
5.69% 
Notes: Results are presented in terms of interest rates rather than inflation rates since a real rate of interest of 3% is assumed. The 
calculations use the Lucas calculated intercept – the standard approach in this literature; results using the estimated intercept give the same 
inferences for the relative size and burden of the welfare costs. WC measures are in £million (2011 prices). %GDP calculations are based on 
the period average for GDP. Per Household calculations are based on 2011 data for Number of UK Households (26.3million: Office of 
National Statistics). 
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TABLE 3.  WELFARE GAIN FROM A 10% DISINFLATION 
(inferred from nominal interest rate ranges: 13% to 3%; 15% to 5%; and  20% to 10%)  
  HOUSEHOLD 
SECTOR 
CORPORATE 
SECTOR 
AGGREGATE 
  Log-log Semi-log Log-log Semi-log Log-log Semi-log 
 
WC(0.13)-
WC(0.03) 
ΔW 741.1016 611.5155 40.9152 36.7226 782.0168 645.8970 
ΔW 
as%C 
0.1204 0.0994     
ΔW 
as%GDP 
0.0718 0.0592 0.0040 0.0036 0.0758 0.0628 
 
WC(0.15)-
WC(0.05) 
ΔW
 
709.2665 736.0993 38.8473 40.9166 748.1138 777.0159 
ΔW 
as%C 
0.1152 0.1196     
ΔW 
as%GDP 
0.0687 0.0713 0.0038 0.0040 0.0725 0.0753 
 
WC(0.20)-
WC(0.10) 
ΔW 658.5632 999.5187 35.5951 53.9080 694.1583 1053.4267 
ΔW 
as%C 
0.1070 0.1624     
ΔW 
as%GDP 
0.0638 0.0968 0.0034 0.0052 0.0672 0.1020 
Notes: See Notes to Table 2. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TABLE A1 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 ADF no trend ADF with trend PP no trend PP with trend 
Household     
m   0.41 (0) -2.63 (0) 0.29 [4] -2.76 [4] 
Δm -9.47*** (0) -9.47*** (0) -9.51*** [4] -9.51*** [4] 
c   0.01 (3) -2.88 (3) 0.05 [5] -2.19 [5] 
Δc -4.28*** (2) -4.27*** (2) -12.96*** [6] -12.92*** [6] 
Corporate     
m   0.41 (0) -2.92 (0) 0.29 [6] -3.04 [6] 
Δm -11.24***  (0) -11.29*** (0) -11.34*** [6] -11.37*** [6] 
y   0.13 (1) -3.56*(3) 0.49 [7] -2.51 [7] 
Δy -3.47*** (2) -3.51** (2) -11.41*** [7] -11.42*** [7] 
Interest Rates     
r -1.29 (0) -4.11*** (1) -1.69 [4] -4.02*** [5] 
Δr -8.32*** (0) -8.33*** (0) -8.29*** [1] -8.31*** [1] 
log r -1.57 (1) -4.14*** (1) -1.49 [4] -4.06*** [5] 
Δlogr -7.89*** (0) -7.91*** (0) -7.83*** [1] -7.88*** [2] 
 
Notes: ADF is the augmented Dickey Fuller test; PP the Philips Peron test.  Numbers in brackets indicate the maximum lag 
on the differenced terms selected by the Schwarz criteria for the ADF and the bandwidth for the PP.  ***, ***, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. m is log of real balances, c is log of total consumer spending measured 
in constant prices, y is log of GDP at 2005 prices and r is the nominal interest rate. Δ is the first difference operator. 
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APPENDIX 2 
CUSUM RESULTS 
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR 
 
Log-log functional form:                
   
Semi-log functional form:    
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